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Reconfiguration and regulation of supply chains and HRM in times of economic crisis 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although it is commonly held that the present period of economic challenges dates back to 
the financial crisis of 2008, a longer view reveals that the global economy has suffered from 
volatile and uneven growth punctuated with recession since the early 1970s, in contrast to 
the long boom of the decades that preceded it. A feature of this long crisis has been the 
relative empowerment of owners and those leveraging highly fungible assets over  long term 
investors and those with sunk capital ± such as workers ± in a specific firm and a particular 
locale (Wood 2013). In response to this, and to greatly heightened global competition, many 
firms have shifted larger components of production towards suppliers, and, in many 
instances adopted a more contingent and arms-length approach to contracting.  
Given these trends, there has been growing interest ± and concern ± about the 
variation in the nature and quality of employment relations and HR practices down supply 
chains (Donaghey et al. 2014; c.f. Gereffi et al. 2005). In particular, concerns have been 
raised about the way in which prominent Western organizations may base their 
competitiveness on the ability to source ultra-low cost components or finished products 
through the use of suppliers that deploy extreme forms of labour repression (Donaghey et al. 
2014). These forms of labour repression, entailing violations of labour rights, have sometimes 
resulted in negative publicity for large multinational firms. The standard corporate line of 
defence of dominant firms in global value chains (GVCs) in response to such periodic 
exposes and scandals has been a lack of knowledge about the excesses of their suppliers 
(Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). Global Value Chain (GVC) theory explores the 
operation of supply networks across national boundaries: its core concern is not only the 
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volume and geographic reach of supplier networks, but the differences in the relative value 
accrued at different stages of the production process and disparities in relative power and 
autonomy (Gereffi et al. 2005). It is these disparities and their causes and consequences for 
human resource management that form the core concern of this chapter.  
This chapter draws on a range of interdisciplinary perspectives from HRM, 
employment relations, global value chains (GVCs) and supply chain management to ask three 
main questions: to what extent do dominant suppliers explicitly or implicitly promote labour 
repression down their supply chains in hard times? How has the reconfiguration of supply 
chains impacted on the dissemination of practices up and down supply chains? And how 
might different -  and in many instances, diminishing - forms of formal and informal 
regulation impact on both of these?   
In response to the long crisis, firms have engaged in the unbundling of vertically 
inteJUDWHGEXUHDXFUDFLHV¶GLUHFWRZQHUVKLSDQGFRQWURORIRSHUDWLRQV. An integral component 
of this unbundling has been via outsourcing and the subsequent development and extension 
of supply chain relations, with the supply chain being simply defined as a network of 
companies that combine together in different ways to deliver goods and services to 
consumers, and in doing so crosses regional, national and continental boundaries 
(Christopher 1998, 2005; Kraus and Lind 2007). This FUHDWLRQRIQHZµintermediate marNHWV¶ 
in formerly integrated production processes (Jacobides 2005, p. 465) has often been 
stimulated by intentions to focus more upon core high value-added competencies, and/or to 
save direct and indirect costs, and/or to develop greater flexibility with regard to demand 
swings and product or service innovation (see Kremic et al. 2006).  
 At the same time, with crisis has come the extension of the geographic scope of 
supply chains; traditional supply chain relations have become greatly extended across 
national boundaries, but with dominant parties retaining or deepening their influence over 
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suppliers, interlinked in what has been termed µglobal value chains µ(GVCs) to reflect 
disparities in power and relative resource allocations and both geographical and 
organizational reconfiguration (Gibbon et al., 2008). These developments have meant that, 
in practice, it is often no longer individual firms but supply chains that compete in particular 
PDUNHWV7KHUHIRUHWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIVXSSO\FKDLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWer-organizational 
relationships, as a basis of competitive advantage, has assumed ever-greater importance 
(Ageron et al. 2013). The resultant vertical disintegration of what Powell (1990) defined as 
conventional bureaucratically ordered production and control µKLHUDUFKLHV¶, and the 
associated emergence of global value chains have together VHUYHGWRµredefine the work and 
HPSOR\PHQWQH[XV¶ for many employees (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005, p.1027).  
  
Reconfiguring of supply chain networks and competitive advantage 
 
Two major episodes of value chain development have occurred: the first was in response to 
the start of the long crisis in the early 1970s, and the second in response to its intensification 
from 2008 onwards. In the case of the former, it constituted a strategic response to the 
exigencies created by structural changes in input costs, technological change (and the 
unanticipated consequences thereof) and intensified global competition (Reve 1990; Harland 
et al. 1999; Kraus and Lind 2007). The restructuring of operations implicit in the 
development and extension of supply chains entails, to varying degrees, a vertically 
LQWHJUDWHGEXUHDXFUDF\µGRZQVL]LQJ¶ to a core of high value-added competencies which 
include a brokerage  role for co-ordinating the network (Budros 2004µRXWVRXUFLQJ¶  upstream 
supply and downstreDPGLVWULEXWLRQDFWLYLWLHVDQGµGHOD\HULQJ¶ since internal hierarchical 
chains of command can become less important and possibly attenuated (Jarillo 1993; 
Nassimbeni 1998; Christopher 1998). Different strategic choices with regard to such 
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organizational unbundling were thought to lead to different types of network. For instance, 
Miles and Snow (1986) first differentiated between: internal network structures which rely on 
internally developed units to provide goods and services to a core organizational unit; stable 
network structures which utilize external providers selectively; and dynamic network structures 
which make extensive use of outsourcing through contracts with external providers. Other 
commentators classified networks according to variation in different aspects of the inter-
organizational relationships which evolve between participants in terms of: strategic alignment 
(Campbell and Wilson 1996); direction and orientation (Hinterhuber and Levin 1994); the 
extent of collaboration (Cravens et al. 1996); the types of co-ordination mechanisms (Grandori 
and Soda 1995); the nature of the social and economic exchanges occurring (Rosenfeld 1996); 
the number of lateral links, reverse loops  and two way exchanges (Harland et al. 2001); and 
the degree of supply chain maturity (Tomkins 2001).   
 To varying degrees, supply chain networks may therefore be seen to entail the vertical 
disintegration of the agglomerated bureaucracy primarily associated with Fordism, and the 
blurring of organizational boundaries (Amaeshi et al. 2008). Here, a range of participatory 
suppliers specialize in the provision of a range of usually relatively lower value-added goods 
and services to lead or buyer firms who have usually retained higher-value added work 
(Kaplinsky 2005). In part enabled by technological developments in communication allowing 
the hyper-mobility of capital (Kraus and Lind 2007), networks were also seen to potentially 
FRQVWLWXWHµOHDQ¶µfle[LEOH¶, low cost organization structures (Womack et al. 1990; Krause 
1997; Cooper and Slagmulder FDSDEOHRIµXQEORFNLQJ¶ organizational learning, 
communication, innovation and change (Badarocco 1991; Bush and Frohman 1991; Hamel 
1991; Bolton et al. 1994; Womack and Jones 1996) whist enabling risk-sharing (Blos et al. 
2009) and the leveraging of inter-firm network resources (Gulati 2007). In other words, 
networks were seen to be able to gain faster access to new markets and develop new products 
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more quickly (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Kamminga 2010) so as to create long term 
competitive advantage by being particularly suited to the contingencies arising in an 
increasingly globalized, uncertain and competitive environment (Antai 2011).  
 These organizational developments have been accompanied by numerous claims 
regarding the economic µup-grading¶ of firm-level competitive advantage (Selwin 2013, p.76) 
and improved flexibility. For instance, it has been argued that it is the network as a whole 
which is usually seen to be flexible rather than the individual supplier, since, due to the 
asymmetrical dependencies often created, it is the mixture of goods and services available to 
the buyer which can be reconfigured by either varying the combination of participants (Piore 
and Sable 1984; Burnes and New 1997; Christopher 1998; Handfield et al. 2000) and/ or by 
enhancing the ability of existing participants to alter their product or service offerings (Gosain 
et al. 2005). In either case, there is also the perceived potential for reducing the cost to the 
buyer of changing products or processes whilst seeking out lower, or squeezing extant, material 
and labour costs. 
 
Reconfiguring of global supply chains and HR practices  
 
The reconfiguration of supply chains has been associated with the rise of more contingent and 
arms-length contracting in many sectors, with important but complex implications for 
employer-employee relations and HR practices. Instead of vertically integrated bureaucracy, 
there has been the development of various combinations of post-bureaucratic, flexible, high 
performance forms of organization and management wherein network development plays a 
significant role as a vehicle for further marketizing the employment relationship and 
associated broader HR practices (see Hastings 1993; Hecksher 1994; Osbourne and Plastric 
1998; Volberda 1998; Applebaum et al. 2000; Hendry 2006; Josserand et al. 2006). These 
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organizational developments arguably reflect the rise of a neo-liberal institutional trajectory, 
thought to be shared, to varying degrees, E\PRVWµDGYDQFHG¶ economies (Streek 2009). Closely 
associated with this perceived trajectory is the demand to open organizations to the discipline 
and associated efficiencies provided by the logic of the free market (Harvey 2005; Kunda 
and Souday 2005; Cerny 2008; Skorstadt 2009; Vallas and Hill 2012). This trend towards 
more µarms¶ length¶ employer-employee relations seems to happen in two interrelated ways.  
 Firstly, global competition and capital mobility exerts pressure to outsource particular 
elements of production processes in order to exploit cost-saving differentials in employment 
conditions (see Flecker 2009), whilst simultaneously increasing the pressure upon retained 
employees to be competitive vis a vis the prospective offerings of alternative external lower-
cost sub-contractors (see Appay 1998; Flecker and Meil 2010, p. 695). In this context, Hendry 
(2001) has argued that agglomerated, vertically integrated, bureaucracies usually protected 
many employees from the operation of market forces. However, post-bureaucratic 
devHORSPHQWVDUHFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\µrelationships between firms and their employees, and 
relationships between employees,«governed quite openly, by rules of the market rather than 
those of WUDGLWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQ¶ (Hendry 2001, p.213; see also du Gay 1996, 2000, 2005; 
Vallas and Hill 2012). Secondly, it has been widely noted that as an alternative to, or as a 
complement for bureaucratic control, management may actively attempt to inscribe retained 
direct employees with the ethos and logic of free market enterprise as part of various culture 
management initiatives which blur the distinction between the identities of consumer and 
employee (du Gay and Salaman 1992; Needham 2003; Salaman 2005; McCabe 2008; 
Keenoy 2009; Makela 2013).  
 It is also evident that through redefining organizational boundaries between internal and 
external labour markets, a significant outcome of vertical disintegration has been the further 
development of segmented labour markets. These processes appear to potentially entail three 
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interrelated developments. First, it has led to the retention of a relatively stable functionally 
flexible core of employees doing high added value work and to a degree being relatively 
sheltered from the negative consequences of such change (Hassel 2014). Second, it has 
resulted in the direct employment of usually less skilled employees sometimes located in 
numerically flexible peripheries undertaking more precarious and vulnerable jobs (Holst 
2014). Third, it has contributed toward the outsourcing of lower added-value work to 
smaller external organizations which, to varying degrees, compete in the open market to 
provide a range of goods and services (Atkinson 1984; Masters and Miles 2002; Kalleberg 
2003). Within these supplier firms, there are sometimes also moves to develop relatively 
stable and skilled core workforces (Selwyn 2012, p.206). Therefore, the implications for 
employment conditions are complex, with the potential for a range of different employer-
employee relationships and HR practices to emerge in response to variable supply chain 
network configurations (Kalleberg 2003; Doellgast and Greer 2007; Taylor 2012).   
 Whilst such potential for variation cannot be ignored, Kalleberg (2009) also argues 
that with the push for flexibility by governments and employers, generally there has been a 
move towards more precarious employment contracts. It is thought that by encouraging the 
proliferation of non-standard employment,  the organizational developments noted above have 
served to reduce job security and increase feelings of insecurity (Fullerton and Wallace 2007; 
Hacker 2008), erode wage rates and extend low wage sectors in western economies (Appay 
1998; Gautié and Schmitt 2010 ), intensify work (Wills 2009), increase inequality (Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2010; Emmeneger et al. 2012), encourage anomie (Sennett 1998, 2006; Johnson 
and Duberley 2011) and  individualize work (Gheradi and Murgai 2013). Moreover, these 
tendencies have been associated with the expectation that management and employees must act 
as competitive free-agents who are often required to sell their labour, directly or indirectly, in 
multiple organizational sites to any available bidder with the responsibility for maintaining 
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their own employability being delegated to the self-investing individual (Arthur and Rousseau 
1996; Cappelli 1999; Barley and Kunda 2004; Cooper 2005; Baruch 2006; Dardot and Laval 
2013). Here, following neoliberal logic regarding the efficiency maximizing attributes of 
competition, employees are subjected to the discipline of market forces: something that 
emphasizes their instrumental value for companies and their ever-present potential for 
disposability (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Flecker 2009). This situation is sometimes 
exacerbated by deteriorating employment conditions caused by opportunistic employers 
eschewing or undermining labour standards and ILO conventions (Horney 2008; Vachani and 
Post 2012; Locke 2013), often in response to the EX\HU¶VODFNRIFRPPLWPHQWWRORQJ-term 
supply chain relationships (Kaufman and Saravanamuthu 2009, p.298) and their strategy of 
exploiting competition between multiple suppliers to reduce costs (Appay 1998). Nevertheless, 
it has been argued that in some situations, the search for lower labour costs has served to 
relatively improve the extant employment conditions of some suppliers, although this may 
have been primarily motivated by branding concerns (Bartley 2007).  
 The degree to which HR practices are influenced may be mediated or intensified by the 
nature of buyer-supplier relationships. The nature of relationships has increasingly been 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHGLQWHUPVRIµWUDQVDFWLRQDO¶DQGµrelDWLRQDO¶FRQWUDFWLQJ, both among 
organizations (Lorenz 1991; Bolton et al. 1994; Brown et al. 2004; Shub and Stonebreaker 
2009; Cadden et al. 2013) and within them (see, for example, Rousseau and Parks 1993). As 
with other conceptualizations, such as µFRHUFLYH¶DQGµHQDEOLQJ¶)UHH 2007)RUµDUP¶VOHQJWK¶
DQGµREOLJDWLRQDO¶6DNR 1992), the transactional-relational classification seems to largely 
derive from MacNeil¶VLGHDO-type formulation (1978, 1985) of contract governance. In this 
formulation, the transactional approach to contract governance was conceptualized in terms of 
a formal adversarial relationship between buyers and suppliers, characterized by a short-term 
economic exchange and zero-sum conflict of interest in which integration and control are 
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achieved through the implementation of binding, legalistic contractual specifications and the 
discipline of quasi-market forces where there is an expectation of no altruistic behaviour 
between parties, and communication is limited and formal. In contrast, a relational approach 
entails a long-term, collaborative, social and economic exchange between parties that is 
characterized by informality, mutual trust, the assumption of mutual gains, interpersonal 
attachments, commitment to specific partners, reciprocal altruism, co-operative problem 
solving and extensive formal and informal communication.  In principle, any firm may manage 
inter-organizational relationships within supply chains using either strategy, or some blend of 
these ideal-types in any particular contract, or different contractual forms with different 
suppliers (Blois 2002).  The nature of buyer-supplier relationships may impact upon 
employment conditions by, for example, either moderating or exacerbating the operation of 
marketization and either enabling or disabling regulation (Grimshaw and Rubery 2005). Where 
firms and their suppliers work closely together there might be transfer of knowledge, which 
could potentially result in the supplier mimicking the good practices HR of the lead firm. 
However, the extent to which knowledge transfer of HR practices is likely to happen may be 
DIIHFWHGE\WKHVXSSOLHU¶VRZQFost-cutting agenda, and external factors such as global 
competition and national legislation (Wood et al, 2016).  
 
The regulation of employment conditions in supply chains 
 
Where employment conditions are adversely affected, there have been calls for increased 
regulation. One of the key actors potentially involved in regulation is the trade union. However, 
vertical disintegration and marketization creates considerable operational problems for trade 
unions that could undermine their ability to regulate employment conditions through collective 
bargaining. Since outsourcing usually moves employment to smaller organizations that are 
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often located abroad, it undermines prior approaches to employment regulation as it disrupts 
mutual dependencies between workers and employers, crucial for meaningful collective 
bargaining. As Wills (2009, pp. 444-5) argues, vertical disintegration creates µVSDWLDODQG
HPRWLRQDOGLVWDQFH¶ EHWZHHQPDQ\ZRUNHUVDQGWKHLUµUHDO¶ employer at the top of the 
contracting chain who ultimately determines their employment conditions. As Riisgaard and 
Hammer (2011, p.168) also note, the resXOWLVWKDWµpower in the employment relationship now 
transcends organizational boundaries.¶ Simultaneously, the threat of outsourcing has also been 
used to wring concessions out of retained employees (see Flecker 2009). In some cases, this 
has led to the adoption of what amounts to a defensive position by trade unions with a focus 
upon protecting core workers to the exclusion of others, thereby increasing labour market 
segmentation (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Nevertheless, in some sectors trade union pressure 
and demands from wider society have promoted better labour standards and employment 
practices amongst suppliers (Hassell 2014), although the extent to which social up-grading has 
happened has been increasingly questioned (Barrientos et al. 2011). Here, much may depend 
upon the prevailing form of network governance which can influence the µvulnerability¶ of 
employers to trade union action (Riisgaard and Hammer 2011, pp.185-6).        
 Another potential form of regulation is internal to the firm. There have been some 
institutional attempts to articulate voluntary labour standards aimed at influencing 
contractors¶ employment practices, especially in global supply chains, to militate against the 
evident potential for a rush to the bottom, possibly encouraged by what may be seen as a 
governance deficit (Locke 2013). Generally, the form that these attempts at supply chain 
regulation take varies considerably (Reinecke et al. 2012). Such interventions could include: 
voluntary codes of conduct, training programmes and supplier audits (see, for example, Ford 
2011); international framework agreements between MNCs and global union federations in 
specific industries (see, for example, the examples provided by the International 
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Organisation of Employers 2006); labour clauses in Generalised Systems of Preferences 
(GSP) and free trade agreements; international guidelines and voluntary labour standards. 
Company codes are often derived from more general codes of practice, such as the ICFTU/ 
ITS basic code of labour practice, the ILO conventions, or Standard SA 8000, a 
management system tool aimed at regulating working conditions. However, Kaufman and 
Saravanamuthu (2009, p.317) argue that if voluntary labour standards such as SA 8000 are to 
deliver long-term benefits to employees they have to be based upon informed worker 
participation in their design, implementation and monitoring and require long-term sustainable 
relationships between buyers and suppliers with added market-based incentives for improved 
social performance. Such a situation is rare: the result, they claim, is that voluntary labour 
standards are primarily direcWHGWRZDUGVµreducing consumer guilt instead of protecting the 
ZHDNHUVWDNHKROGHUV¶ (Kaufman and Saravanamuthu 2009, p.309; see also Locke 2013). 
Thus, codes of conduct are arguably the weakest form of private regulation (Donaghey et al 
2014). Moreover, voluntary labour standards are constantly undermined by the cost-
minimization pressures present in highly competitive global markets (Anner et al., 2013; 
Barrientos et al. 2011).  Thus, labour standards can often decline down the supply chain 
(Taylor, 2012). However, the extent of decline may vary, and is also influenced by factors such 
as supply chain strategies of multinationals and their fear of reputational damage, trade union 
and consumer pressure and industry and ownership form (Taylor, 2012; Donaghey et al 2014).  
 The implications for HR practices can therefore vary according to a range of extra, intra 
and inter organizational factors including location of a particular workplace in the supply chain, 
the nature of the work being undertaken, the availability of alternative sources of labour, and, 
significantly, the nature of the social and economic relationships between customers and 
suppliers. Although the broad process of liberalization and contingent contracting may have 
intensified since 2008, it can be argued that variation persists according to sector and locale. As 
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Jessop (2012) notes, whilst neo-liberalism has attained global ecosystemic dominance, its 
consequences are unevenly spread, with the persistence of different types of national 
mediation. In terms of global value chains, low cost production in some locales may undermine 
higher value added production paradigms elsewhere, and in others help to shore them up.  
The way in which the different trends are inter-related is outlined in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Reconfiguration and regulation of supply chains and HR practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Although the intensification of the crisis from 2008 onwards may have been the direct 
response to the neo-liberal reforms which flowed from its original onset in the 1970s, its 
consequences led to further strengthening the hand of highly mobile and uncommitted 
investors following on from lavish state bailouts of the financial services industry, and a 
blind rush towards quantitative easing that saw trillions conjured out of the air, and just as 
mysteriously vanish again. All of these developments have greatly strengthened the hands of 
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owners and those leveraging highly fungible assets; this grouping are far removed from 
traditional rentiers, and Sovereign Wealth Funds, the overseas investment arms of national 
governments, have been added to their ranks (Wood 2013). Although the global investor 
ecosystem is an undeniably diverse one, many have little commitment to any industry or 
locale, which is particularly bad news for workers, who do not enjoy the same mobility as is 
the case for capital or production processes.    
The financial strategies undertaken mean that many of the processes highlighted 
within this chapter have been greatly accelerated. Even where firms are seeking to embrace 
a high quality paradigm, trends such as outsourcing represent a weakening of the cognitive 
capabilities of organization, reflecting the cumulative knowledge and understanding of 
groupings of employees working closely together; hence, they may have negative 
consequences for firms seeking advantage on the basis of quality or incremental innovation 
(Aoki 2010). Moreover, outsourcing is one of the main mechanisms driving precarity: this 
constitutes part and parcel of a move away from relational and toward ever-more 
transactional employment relationships, with some workers being regarded as core to the 
business function, and others as peripheral, reflected in changes to conditions of service and 
job security (Kalleberg 2009). The focus on numerical flexibility through outsourcing down 
supply chains can lead to unintended outcomes and costs; the monitoring of contingent 
labour and outsourced work further down supply chains is necessary if reputational scandals 
are to be avoided and quality upheld (c.f. Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Dibben et al 2016). 
Yet, there are significant counter-pressures, and potential alternatives to this low road 
scenario: consumers have exerted some degree of influence on the practices of a number of 
high profile firms. Meanwhile, major coordinated markets such as Germany and 
Scandinavia have revitalised since the shocks of 2008, and in contrast to the period of neo-
liberal triumphalism in the 1990s and early 2000s, their convergence with liberal market, 
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shareholder dominant models no longer seems inevitable or likely. Further afield, the fastest 
growing emerging markets are generally distinguished by not following the liberal market 
model. This does not mean that they are necessarily associated with high labour standards, 
but rather that there is a capacity and appetite for regulation that is absent in the liberal 
markets. Therefore, the lessons from the most recent turn of the long crisis suggest that the 
patterns identified in much of the existing literature on HRM and value chains ± that of 
contingent contracting and worsening labour standards ± may not necessarily represent the 
inevitable global norm.   
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